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  OPINION 
________________                              
 
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This appeal arises from the certification of a class, 
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the approval of a settlement, and the award of attorneys’ 
fees in a products liability suit concerning defective cars 
manufactured by Volkswagen of America, Inc., Audi of 
America, Inc., and related entities (collectively, 
“Volkswagen”).1
                                                 
1 The full list of defendants includes: Volkswagen of 
America, Inc.; Volkswagen AG; Volkswagen 
Beteilingungs Gesellschaft M.B.H.; Audi of America, 
Inc.; Audi AG; Volkswagen de Mexico, S.A. de C.V.; 
Volkswagen Group of America; and Audi of America, 
LLC. 
  As part of the settlement, one group of 
class members (the “reimbursement group”) received the 
right to reimbursement for certain qualifying damages, 
paid from an $8 million fund.  The remaining class 
members (the “residual group”) were required to wait 
until the reimbursement group made its claims.  The 
residual group could then make “goodwill” claims on the 
remaining money in the fund.  Those monies were to be 
distributed pro rata amongst the residual claimants.  The 
District Court certified a single class containing both the 
reimbursement group and the residual group.  On appeal, 
objectors Joshua West, Lester Brickman, Darren 
McKinney, and Michael Sullivan (collectively the “West 
Objectors”) argue that the representative plaintiffs in this 
suit, all members of the reimbursement group, cannot 
adequately represent the interests of the class members in 
the residual group.  We agree.  We conclude that the 
interests of the representative plaintiffs do not 
sufficiently align with those of the unnamed plaintiffs in 
the residual group, and that the class thus fails to satisfy 
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(4).  We will 
reverse the District Court’s order certifying the class and 
remand for further proceedings. 
 
I. 
A. 
 In May 2007, two groups of plaintiffs (the “Dewey 
plaintiffs” and the “Delguercio plaintiffs”) filed separate 
class action suits against Volkswagen.  On June 22, 2007, 
the cases were consolidated for pre-trial purposes 
because they raised substantially similar allegations:  that 
several models of Volkswagen and Audi automobiles had 
defectively designed sunroofs that, when clogged by 
plant debris and pollen, allowed water to leak into the 
vehicle.  While leakage could be prevented through 
regular cleaning and maintenance, Volkswagen allegedly 
failed to inform car owners of these preventive measures 
because such a disclosure would acknowledge a design 
defect, and would likely obligate Volkswagen to cover 
any resulting damage under their warranty program. 
 The Dewey plaintiffs allege:  (1) violations of New 
Jersey’s Consumer Fraud Act (“NJCFA”); (2) violations 
of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”); (3) common 
law fraud; (4) negligent misrepresentation; and (5) breach 
of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.  The 
Delguercio plaintiffs allege:  (1) breaches of express and 
implied warranties; (2) improper repairs of vehicles; (3) 
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (4) 
negligent misrepresentations; (5) violations of the 
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NJCFA; (6) unjust enrichment; and (7) fraud. 
After two years of discovery, the parties notified 
the Court that they were entering into settlement 
negotiations.  The Court suspended pretrial deadlines and 
set a deadline for a joint motion for preliminary 
settlement approval.  On November 10, 2009, the District 
Court approved the parties’ request to refer the case to a 
magistrate judge “to conduct all settlement proceedings 
and enter final judgment.”  The case was referred to 
Magistrate Judge Patty Shwartz. 
B. 
On January 29, 2010, the parties filed a joint 
motion for preliminary approval of a settlement, 
preliminary certification of a class, and appointment of 
class counsel.  The parties requested certification of the 
following class: 
(a) all Persons, other than officers, 
directors, or employees of the 
defendants, who purchased or leased, 
new or used, the following settlement 
class vehicles: 
• 2001-2007 Volkswagen New 
Beetle vehicles with Vehicle 
Identification Numbers (VINs) 
below 3VW---1C-7M514779, 
equipped with sunroof; 
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• 2001-2005 Jetta A4 Sedan with 
VINs with “9M” in position 7 
and 8, and 2001-2005 
Volkswagen Jetta Wagon A4 
vehicles with VINs with “1J” in 
position 7 and 8, equipped with 
sunroof; 
• 2001-2006 Volkswagen Golf 
A4, Volkswagen GTI A4 
vehicles with VINs with “1J” in 
position 7 and 8, equipped with 
sunroof; 
• 2005-2007 Volkswagen Jetta 
A5 vehicles with VINs with 
“1K” in position 7 and 8, 
equipped with sunroof; 
• 2006-2007 Volkswagen 
Golf/GTI A5 vehicles with 
VINs with “1K” in position 7 
and 8, equipped with sunroof; 
• 1999-2005 Volkswagen Passat 
B5 vehicles; 
• 1997-2006 Audi A4 vehicles, 
B5 and B6 Platforms in 
MY2005, with VINs with “8E” 
in position 7 and 8 with also 
“J” or “L” or “V” or “P” or “X” 
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in position 4, and MY2005 and 
MY2006, with VINs with “8H” 
in position 7 and 8 (including 
Cabrio, S, and RS versions); 
• 1998-2005 Audi A6 C5 
vehicles with VINs with “4B” 
in position 7 and 8 (including 
Allroad, S, and RS versions); 
[the “reimbursement group”] 
and 
(b)  all persons, other than officers, 
directors, or employees of the 
defendants, who currently own or 
lease the following settlement class 
vehicles: 
• 1998-2000 and 2007-2009 
Volkswagen New Beetle with 
VINs 3VW---1C-7M514779 or 
higher, equipped with sunroof; 
• 1997-1999 Volkswagen Jetta 
A3 with VINs with “1H” in 
position 7 and 8, 1999-2000 
Volkswagen Jetta A4s with 
VINs with “9M” in position 7 
and 8, and 2008-2009 
Volkswagen Jetta A5 vehicles 
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with VINs with “1K” in 
position 7 and 8, equipped with 
sunroof; 
• 1997-1999 Volkswagen 
Golf/GTI A3 with VINs with 
“1H” in position 7 and 8, 1999-
2000 Volkswagen Golf/GTI A4 
with VINs with “1J” in position 
7 and 8, and 2008-2009 
Volkswagen Golf/GTI A5 
vehicles with VINs with “1K” 
in position 7 and 8, equipped 
with sunroof; 
• 1998 Volkswagen Passat B5 
vehicles; 
• 1997 Volkswagen Passat B4 
and 2006-2009 Volkswagen 
Passat B6 vehicles equipped 
with sunroof; 
• 2004-2009 Volkswagen 
Touareg vehicles; 
• 2005-2008 Audi A4 B7 
Platform vehicles equipped 
with sunroof, in MY2005, with 
VINs with “8E” in position 7 
and 8 and also “A” or “D” or 
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“K” or “G” or “U” in position 4 
(including S and RS versions); 
• 1997 Audi A6 C4 vehicles; 
• 2005-2009 Audi A6 C6 
vehicles equipped with sunroof 
with VINs with “4A” or “4F” 
in position 7 and 8 (including S 
and RS versions); 
• 1997-2009 Audi A8 vehicles 
(including S versions) 
[the “residual group”] 
App’x A13-14.  All of the representative plaintiffs in the 
case are members of the reimbursement group.   
 The settlement agreement made three types of 
relief available to the class.  First, the settlement 
agreement provided that all class members would receive 
“[e]ducational preventative maintenance information.”  
App’x A317.  This information instructed class members 
how to inspect and clean their sunroofs to avoid leakage.   
 Second, the settlement agreement designated 
certain car models in the reimbursement group whose 
owners or lessees would be eligible to take their cars to 
any authorized Volkswagen dealership for removal of a 
problematic valve on the sunroof and for inspection of 
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the sunroof drains and drain hoses.  These service actions 
would be performed free of charge to the class member. 
 Finally, the settlement agreement created an $8 
million reimbursement fund that would be made 
available to reimburse class members for certain 
“reimbursable repairs.”2
                                                 
2 The agreement defined “reimbursable repairs” as: 
  The settlement agreement 
provided that the claims administrator would satisfy all 
claims made by members of the reimbursement group for 
reimbursable repairs.  If the $8 million reimbursement 
cleaning, drying or replacement of 
carpeting, including padding, and/or repair 
or replacement of [specified components], 
and/or repair and replacement of any 
component of the sunroof drain system 
and/or plenum drain system, in response to a 
documented customer complaint or report of 
water entering the passenger compartment 
through or due to the sunroof drain system 
or plenum area . . . of a Settlement Class 
Vehicle . . . which cleaning, drying, or repair 
or replacement was performed prior to the 
date on which Notice is mailed by the 
Settlement Administrator and for which 
Proof of Repair is timely tendered.   
 
App’x A311. 
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fund was not sufficient to satisfy these claims, the claims 
would be “made on a pro rata basis.”  App’x A320.  If 
there was money remaining in the fund after these 
reimbursement claims were settled, it would be used to 
satisfy “goodwill” claims consisting of:  (1) 
reimbursement claims made by members of the residual 
group; and (2) reimbursements for nonreimbursable 
repairs paid for by members of the reimbursement group.  
App’x A321.  The fund would accept goodwill claims up 
to five years after the effective date of the settlement.3
The District Court preliminarily approved the 
settlement, preliminarily certified the class, and 
appointed class counsel.  The District Court’s Order 
required that notice be communicated in three different 
ways:  (1) direct mail to all class members for whom 
mailing addresses were available; (2) a class website with 
an electronic version of the mailed notices and a claim 
form; and (3) publication in USA Today.  This notice was 
  
App’x A321-22.  Five years after the effective date, any 
money remaining in the fund would be “donated to an 
educational, charitable, and/or research facility in the 
United States and dedicated to specific projects and 
programs benefitting automobile safety and/or 
environmental technology . . . .”  Id. 
                                                 
3 The effective date was “the first date on which all 
appellate rights with respect to the Judgment have 
expired or have been conclusively exhausted in a manner 
that affirms the Judgment.”  App’x A307. 
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sent to approximately 4.2 million Volkswagen owners 
and 2.1 million Audi owners.4
 The District Court ordered the representative 
plaintiffs to file a memorandum in support of final 
settlement approval by June 17, 2010, with opposition 
briefs due June 28, 2010.
 
5
                                                 
4 In June 2010, the parties mailed a second set of notices 
to owners of approximately 550,000 class vehicles who 
did not receive the first notice. 
  The court also scheduled a 
 
5 On July 12, 2010, after the June 28, 2010 deadline had 
passed, the West Objectors moved for leave to file a 
response to plaintiffs’ memorandum in support of final 
settlement approval.  The District Court denied the West 
Objectors’ motion.  On appeal, the West Objectors argue 
that they were denied due process because the District 
Court required that they file their objection before 
representative plaintiffs filed their fee petition.  As the 
District Court noted in its opinion, the West Objectors 
misunderstand the court’s scheduling order.  The West 
Objectors had until June 21 to file an opposition to the 
fee petition, and until June 28 to file an opposition to 
plaintiffs’ memorandum in support of final certification.  
The West Objectors missed both of these deadlines.  
Having cited no case law suggesting that due process 
requires a District Court to allow objectors to file such 
untimely response briefs, we conclude that the West 
Objectors had a “reasonable opportunity” to respond to 
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fairness hearing for July 26, 2010.  On June 9, 2010, the 
representative plaintiffs filed a joint motion for attorneys’ 
fees in advance of the fairness hearing.  In support of 
their motion, they attached the expert report of Dr. 
George Eads, an economist who placed the value of the 
settlement at over $142 million.   
On June 11, 2010, objectors Daniel Sibley and 
George Stevens (the “Sibley Objectors”) filed an 
objection to the settlement and a notice of intent to 
appear at the fairness hearing.  The Sibley Objectors 
raised objections to the notice, the plan of allocation, and 
representative plaintiffs’ fee petition.  They did not at 
that time argue that the Magistrate Judge lacked 
jurisdiction over the case. 
On June 14, 2010, the West Objectors, represented 
by the Center for Class Action Fairness, filed an 
objection to the settlement and a notice of intent to 
appear at the fairness hearing.  The West Objectors raised 
several objections to the adequacy of representation, the 
presence of an intra-class conflict, the fairness of the 
settlement, and the requested attorneys’ fee award.   
In total, in a class consisting of approximately 5.5 
million members, 203 class members objected to the 
                                                                                                             
plaintiffs’ papers, and that they simply failed to avail 
themselves of the opportunity.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h). 
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settlement or the fee petition.6
C. 
  Additionally, 1,119 
potential class members opted out of the class and the 
settlement. 
Finally, on July 26, 2010, the District Court held a 
fairness hearing on the settlement agreement and the fee 
petition.  At the hearing, representative plaintiffs called 
Eads to testify about the value of the settlement.  
Volkswagen did not cross-examine Eads, but the 
Magistrate Judge independently and thoroughly 
examined Eads about his methodology.  First, she asked 
about the “subcategories” in Eads’s report—groups of 
class members who received different sets of notices 
based on their car models and the settlement benefits 
available to them.  She then asked Eads whether he 
divided the class into the subgroups, or whether he knew 
the basis for the divisions.  Eads responded that the 
lawyers had independently grouped the class members, 
and that he was not aware of the method they used.  He 
noted, however, that the grouping did seem to have some 
empirical basis grounded in the likelihood of 
experiencing leakage.  The Judge followed up by asking 
                                                 
6 Notice was directed to the owners of over six million 
class vehicles.  Because many of these owners were 
“fleet buyers,” and owned multiple class vehicles, the 
size of the class was appreciably lower than the size of 
the class vehicle pool. 
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whether Eads had determined why the residual group was 
excluded from seeking reimbursements.7  He responded 
that he did not know why the residual group was 
excluded, but said he assumed it was the product of 
negotiations between counsel.8
                                                 
7 The residual group was, in fact, allowed to make 
reimbursement claims.  They were simply restricted to 
making “goodwill” claims from the residual of the $8 
million fund after the reimbursement group claims had 
been paid.  App’x A321. 
   
 
8 After the District Court completed its questioning, 
counsel for the West Objectors sought leave to cross-
examine Eads.  The District Court declined to allow the 
West Objectors to cross-examine Eads, noting that they 
had failed to notify the parties of their intent to cross-
examine Eads prior to the hearing, and that the court had 
already sufficiently questioned Eads.  The West 
Objectors argue on appeal that they were denied due 
process when the District Court failed to allow them to 
cross-examine Eads.   
 The West Objectors are correct that they have a 
limited right to discovery that can, in certain 
circumstances, include the opportunity to cross-examine 
witnesses before the court.  In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 
418 F.3d 277, 316 (3d Cir. 2005); see Greenfield v. 
Villager Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d 824, 833 (3d Cir. 1973) 
(noting that “an objector at a [fairness] hearing is entitled 
to an opportunity to develop a record in support of his 
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After Eads finished testifying, the court asked for 
argument from the objectors.  Counsel for the West 
Objectors spoke first, raising several arguments as to why 
the proposed class failed to meet the requirements of 
Rule 23, and why the settlement should be rejected.  
After being pressed by the Magistrate Judge, counsel 
                                                                                                             
contentions by means of cross-examination”).  This right, 
however, is not absolute.  Rather, “[t]he District Court 
has discretion to ‘employ the procedures that it perceives 
will best permit it to evaluate the fairness of the 
settlement.’”  Id. (quoting In re Prudential Ins. Co. of 
Am. Sales Practices Litig., 962 F. Supp. 450, 563 (D.N.J. 
1997), aff’d 148 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 1998)).  The extent to 
which the District Court’s procedures limit the objectors’ 
rights is “predicated on the total inadequacy of the record 
upon which the settlement was approved and the ‘totality 
of the circumstances surrounding the settlement hearing’ 
in which the objector was denied meaningful 
participation.”  Id. (quoting Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 
153, 157 (3d Cir. 1975)).  We review for an abuse of 
discretion.  See id.  at 317.   
In this case, the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in concluding that the totality of the 
circumstances did not require further cross-examination 
at the fairness hearing.  The Magistrate Judge had already 
thoroughly and effectively cross-examined Eads, and the 
court assured the West Objectors that they could 
substantively criticize Eads’ methodology during their 
argument to the court. 
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stated that his primary argument was that there was “an 
Amchem problem”9
After the remaining objectors made their 
arguments, representative plaintiffs were given time for 
further argument.  Representative plaintiffs argued that 
the class members all suffer common problems with the 
drain systems that were “failing for the same reason.”  
App’x A1108.  Representative plaintiffs also suggested 
that even if there were differences between class 
members, “we’ve dealt with this through subclasses for 
relief purposes.”  App’x A1109.
 in that “[c]lass members who are 
going to suffer damage in the future  . . .  are releasing 
their claims and have no relief under this settlement and 
they’re not represented by any of the current class 
representatives because all of the class representatives 
have current claims, not future claims.”  App’x A1102.  
In other words, counsel recast his earlier arguments in 
adequacy of representation terms under Rule 23(a)(4). 
10
                                                 
9 Counsel was referring to the Supreme Court’s opinion 
in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 
(1996). 
  The Magistrate Judge 
 
10 We find it remarkable that the parties continually 
referred to different subcategories of plaintiffs in the 
certified class as “subclasses.”  At oral argument, 
Volkswagen characterized the parties’ use of the term as 
an “unfortunate choice of language . . . used by the 
plaintiffs’ expert.”  Oral Arg. Tr. at 23:19-21.  We find 
the use of the term problematic.  The fact is that the 
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then allowed Volkswagen time for further argument.  
Volkswagen first argued that there was no adequacy 
problem, because “the Class representatives have the 
same interest as everyone else . . . .”  App’x A1128-29.  
Volkswagen also pointed out that there were very few 
objectors and opt-outs, and argued that the small number 
implied that the settlement was fair. 
D. 
On August 3, 2010, the District Court issued an 
order certifying the class, approving the settlement, and 
granting representative plaintiffs’ fee petition.  The 
Magistrate Judge first addressed class certification, 
addressing each of the Rule 23 requirements.  Notably, as 
to adequacy, the court found that there were no intra-
class conflicts because “[t]he named plaintiffs are in the 
same position as the class members because each of them 
owned or leased the subject vehicles that contained the 
allegedly defective plenum or sunroof drain system, 
receiving allegedly inadequate maintenance 
recommendations and, as a result, suffered the same 
injury.”  App’x A82.  The court further noted that “[t]he 
fact that the relief class members receive may differ 
                                                                                                             
parties did not propose and the court did not certify 
separate subclasses.  The use of the term is misleading, as 
actual subclasses may have mooted the adequacy issue 
raised in this very appeal.  For purposes of this opinion 
we refer to the seven groups identified by Dr. Eads as 
“subcategories” rather than subclasses. 
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based upon the vehicle the member owned or leased does 
not reflect antagonism or differing interests.  Rather, it 
reflects the compromise reached to address the frequency 
[with which] problems were reported for each model.”  
App’x A83.   
After concluding that the Rule 23 requirements 
were met, the court moved on to consider whether the 
settlement was fair and reasonable, pursuant to Rule 
23(e).  In analyzing the reasonableness of the settlement, 
the court considered the so-called Girsh factors: 
(1)  the complexity, expense and likely 
duration of the litigation; 
(2) the reaction of the class to the 
settlement; 
(3) the stage of the proceedings and the 
amount of discovery completed; 
(4)  the risks of establishing liability; 
(5)  the risks of establishing damages; 
(6)  the risks of maintaining the class action 
through the trial; 
(7)  the ability of the defendants to withstand 
a greater judgment; 
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(8)  the range of reasonableness of the 
settlement fund in light of the best 
possible recovery; and  
(9) the range of reasonableness of the 
settlement fund to a possible recovery in 
light of all the attendant risks of 
litigation. 
Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 157 (3d Cir. 1975).  The 
court found that each of these factors either weighed in 
favor of the settlement, or was neutral.   
In order to analyze the reaction of the class to the 
settlement, the second Girsh factor, the court considered 
the objections to the settlement.  The court noted that: 
Several objectors asserted that the division 
of class members into subclasses produced 
conflicts of interest which led to inequitable 
remedies.  These divisions and the resulting 
remedies are based on objective criteria, 
namely the past frequency of failure and the 
design of the vehicles.  This is a reasonable 
basis to decide the relief to be provided, 
particularly where complete, individualized 
relief for each class member could not be 
negotiated.  All class members, even those 
in the subclass that receives only 
preventative care information, receive 
something of value.  Thus, the division of 
class members into subclasses receiving 
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different benefits based upon the type of 
vehicle they own does not necessarily render 
the settlement unfair or unreasonable, nor 
does it show a conflict of interest that 
renders the class representatives unable to 
adequately represent the class.   
App’x A102.  Having concluded that the class met the 
requirements of Rule 23 and that the settlement was “fair 
and reasonable,” the court certified the class and 
approved the settlement. 
The court then considered the representative 
plaintiffs’ petition for attorneys’ fees and incentive 
awards.  The court approved a fee award of $9.2 million, 
and approved a $10,000 incentive award for each 
representative plaintiff.   
II. 
 The West Objectors and the Sibley Objectors 
separately appeal from the District Court’s order 
certifying the class, approving the settlement, and 
granting representative plaintiffs’ fee petition.  The West 
and Sibley Objectors raise a host of issues on appeal.  
Volkswagen and the representative plaintiffs also filed 
cross-appeals.  Because we conclude that the District 
Court improperly certified the class, we limit our 
discussion to two issues:  (1) whether the Magistrate 
Judge possessed, and consequently, whether this court 
possesses jurisdiction over this case absent the 
affirmative consent of the unnamed plaintiffs; and (2) 
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whether the class, as certified, satisfies the adequacy 
requirement of Rule 23(a)(4). 
A. 
The District Court had diversity jurisdiction over 
the case pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act of 
2005.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).  A magistrate judge may 
exercise jurisdiction over a case in which a federal 
district court had jurisdiction “[u]pon the consent of the 
parties.”  28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1).  Where the parties 
properly consent to allow the magistrate judge to exercise 
jurisdiction over the case, 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3) permits 
the parties to “appeal directly to the appropriate United 
States court of appeals from the judgment of the 
magistrate judge,” as opposed to appealing to the district 
court that referred the case to the magistrate judge.  
“Accordingly, [this court’s] final order jurisdiction to 
review such an order arises from 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3) to 
the extent it is final under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.”  Skretvedt 
v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours, 372 F.3d 193, 200 n.7 (3d 
Cir. 2004).   
The failure to satisfy the requirements of 
§ 636(c)(1) deprives the magistrate judge of jurisdiction 
over the case.  See McQueen v. Beecher Cmty. Sch., 433 
F.3d 460, 472 (6th Cir. 2006).  Similarly, where the 
requirements of § 636(c)(1) are not satisfied, we lack 
jurisdiction under § 636(c)(3), and the parties must 
appeal directly to the district court that referred the case 
pursuant to the procedures outlined in 28 U.S.C. § 
636(b)(1).  Cf. Skretvedt, 372 F.3d at 200 n.7. 
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The Sibley Objectors argue that they, and other 
unnamed class members, are “parties” within the 
meaning of § 636(c)(1), and that their consent was 
required in order for the Magistrate Judge to exercise 
jurisdiction over the case.  If the Magistrate Judge lacked 
jurisdiction over the case under § 636(c)(1), this court 
would lack jurisdiction pursuant to § 636(c)(3).  Because 
this issue concerns our jurisdiction over this appeal, we 
address it even though the Sibley Objectors did not first 
raise the issue in their written objection filed with the 
District Court.  Nesbit v. Gears Unlimited, Inc., 347 F.3d 
72, 76-77 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that jurisdiction is a 
non-waivable issue, and that “courts have an independent 
obligation to satisfy themselves of jurisdiction if it is in 
doubt”).  We review the issue de novo.  See Great W. 
Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 
159, 163-64 (3d Cir. 2010). 
The Seventh Circuit rejected such an argument in 
Williams v. General Electric Capital Auto Lease, Inc., 
159 F.3d 266, 269 (7th Cir. 1998).  Williams held that 
unnamed class members are not “parties” within the 
meaning of § 636(c)(1); rather, “they are more accurately 
regarded as having something less than full party status . 
. . .”  Id. at 269.  As a result, the court held that the 
affirmative consent of all unnamed class members is not 
required in order for a magistrate judge to exercise 
jurisdiction over a case.  If an unnamed class member 
objects to trying the case before a magistrate judge, that 
class member has two options: 
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First, she may apply to the district court to 
intervene under Rule 24(a), become a party 
to the lawsuit, and then exercise her right to 
withhold her consent to proceed before the 
magistrate.  Or, after the entry of final 
judgment, the unnamed class member can 
raise a collateral attack based on due process 
against the named representative’s decision 
to consent under § 636(c). . . . Alternatively, 
the unnamed class member could try to 
show in a collateral attack that the decision 
to proceed before a magistrate judge was a 
matter on which there was a. . . significant 
intra-class conflict and that the notice the 
absentee received was inadequate to inform 
her of this conflict.11
Id. at 269-70.  We agree with the Seventh Circuit that 
unnamed class members are not “parties” within the 
meaning of § 636(c)(1), and that their consent is not 
required for a magistrate judge to exercise jurisdiction 
over a case. 
 
The Sibley Objectors argue that Williams was 
                                                 
11 The Sibley Objectors do not raise any possible intra-
class conflicts as concerns the decision to proceed before 
the Magistrate Judge.  The only intra-class conflicts that 
they raise concern the interests and incentives of 
representative plaintiffs in the process of negotiating the 
settlement agreement. 
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implicitly overruled by Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1 
(2002).  In Devlin, the Supreme Court held that unnamed 
class members are parties “for the purposes of bringing 
an appeal[.]”  Id. at 9.  Devlin did not consider § 
636(c)(1), and in no way disturbed the reasoning in 
Williams.  Indeed, the Devlin court carefully limited its 
holding, noting that “[un]named class members . . . may 
be parties for some purposes and not for others.”  Id. at 9-
10.  The Supreme Court specifically stated that its 
holding did not “conflict with any other aspect of class 
action procedure.”  Id. at 9.  The fact that unnamed class 
members may be parties for the purposes of bringing an 
appeal does not mean that they are, ipso facto, parties 
within the meaning of § 636(c)(1).  As the Williams court 
noted, such a “radical result” would “virtually eliminate 
§ 636(c) referrals to magistrate judges in all potential 
class actions, because it would de facto transform all 
such cases into ‘opt-in’ style actions . . . .”  Williams, 159 
F.3d at 269.  Consequently, we conclude that the 
Magistrate Judge properly exercised jurisdiction over this 
case. 
B. 
 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(4) requires 
that “the representative parties [in a class action] . . . 
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.”12
                                                 
12 A similar requirement is found in the Due Process 
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which 
“of course require[ ] that the named plaintiff[s] at all 
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The adequacy requirement has two components:  (1) 
concerning the experience and performance of class 
counsel; and (2) concerning the interests and incentives 
of the representative plaintiffs.  In re Cmty. Bank of N. 
Va., 418 F.3d 277, 303 (3d Cir. 2005) [hereinafter 
“Community Bank I”].13
We review the District Court’s order certifying the 
class for an abuse of discretion.  See In re DVI, Inc. Sec. 
  The West Objectors question 
only the second component, arguing that two separate 
intra-class conflicts prevent the representative plaintiffs 
from adequately representing the entire class.   
                                                                                                             
times adequately represent the interests of the absent 
class members.”  Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 
U.S. 797, 811-12 (1985).  The West Objectors do not 
phrase their argument in constitutional terms, and even if 
they did, it is unclear what differences, if any, exist 
between the adequacy requirement under the Due Process 
Clause and under Rule 23. See Samuel Issacharoff & 
Richard A. Nagareda, Class Settlements Under Attack, 
156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1649, 1676 (2008).  
  
13 “Although questions concerning the adequacy of class 
counsel were traditionally analyzed under the aegis of the 
adequate representation requirement of Rule 23(a)(4) . . . 
those questions have, since 2003, been governed by Rule 
23(g).”  Sheinberg v. Sorensen, 606 F.3d 130, 132 (3d 
Cir. 2010).  Because the parties do not dispute the 
adequacy of class counsel, we consider the adequacy 
requirement strictly through the lens of Rule 23(a)(4). 
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Litig., 639 F.3d 623, 629 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011).  Similarly, 
“‘[w]here the district court has declined to certify a 
subclass’ and treats all class members as falling within a 
single class for purposes of a fund allocation, ‘we will 
ordinarily defer to its decision unless it constituted an 
abuse of discretion.’”  Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 
273, 326 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting In re Ins. 
Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d 241, 271 (3d Cir. 
2009)).  An abuse of discretion “occurs if the district 
court’s decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of 
fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper 
application of law to fact.  [W]hether an incorrect legal 
standard has been used is an issue of law to be reviewed 
de novo.”  In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 
F.3d 305, 312 (3d Cir. 2009) (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
1. 
 The Supreme Court has twice considered this 
component of the adequacy requirement, first in Amchem 
Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1996), and 
second in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 
(1997).  In Amchem, plaintiffs brought suit against 
defendant manufacturers of asbestos products.  The 
parties reached an agreement to settle the case, then 
sought certification from the district court of a settlement 
class.  Under the terms of the global settlement, the 
benefits received varied significantly from class member 
to class member.  While some members could receive as 
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much as $200,000, others received nothing.  The District 
Court approved the settlement and certified the class. 
 This court reversed, concluding that “serious intra-
class conflicts preclude[d] th[e] class from meeting the 
adequacy of representation requirement.”  Georgine v. 
Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 630 (3d Cir. 1996).  
We acknowledged that all parties had an incentive to 
maximize their recovery, but noted that “the settlement 
does more than simply provide a general recovery fund[,] 
[r]ather, it makes important judgments on how recovery 
is to be allocated among different kinds of plaintiffs, 
decisions that necessarily favor some claimants over 
others.”  Id.    
Our opinion focused on the conflict between class 
members who already manifested injuries and those who 
had not yet manifested injuries.  We recognized that class 
members without manifest injuries would “want 
protection against inflation for distant recoveries[,] . . . 
sturdy back-end opt-out rights and ‘causation provisions 
that can keep pace with changing science and medicine, 
rather than freezing in place the science of 1993.’”  
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 610-11 (quoting Georgine, 83 F.3d 
at 630-31).  These incentives contrasted with the 
incentives of class members with manifest injuries, who 
“would care little about such provisions and would 
rationally trade them for higher current payouts.”  Id. at 
611. 
The Supreme Court affirmed, stating that “[t]he 
adequacy inquiry under Rule 23(a)(4) serves to uncover 
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conflicts of interest between named parties and the class 
they seek to represent.”  Id. at 625.  The court agreed that 
“the interests of those within the single class are not 
aligned,” and suggested that the problem might be solved 
if the class members were divided into “discrete 
subclasses.”  Id. at 626. 
The Supreme Court revisited the issue two terms 
later in Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 855-59.  Ortiz also concerned a 
settlement in a class action suit against an asbestos 
manufacturer.  The Fifth Circuit approved a settlement 
that excluded a number of potential class members with 
claims indistinguishable from the claims of the members 
of the settlement class, and provided the same benefit for 
all class members regardless of the strength of their 
claims.   
The Supreme Court reversed on adequacy grounds.  
Id.  The Court cited two specific intra-class conflicts that 
rendered the named plaintiffs inadequate class 
representatives.  First, it noted that under Amchem, 
present and future claimants have different incentives in 
negotiating a settlement, and that present claimants 
cannot adequately represent future claimants.  Id. at 856-
57.  Second, it noted that the class included plaintiffs 
exposed both before and after the defendant’s insurance 
policy had expired.  Id. at 857-58.  Because the pre-
expiration claimants had access to insurance proceeds, 
they had access to a bigger pool of money from which to 
recover.  Post-expiration claimants lacked the incentive 
to seriously pursue reimbursement under the relevant 
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insurance policies because they could not benefit from 
such proceeds.   
The Court again explicitly rejected the argument 
that the class members all had the same incentive simply 
because all members of the class wished for a maximum 
recovery.  Id.  Rather, the Court concluded that the intra-
class conflicts prevented the representative plaintiffs 
from adequately representing the entire class.  The Court 
reiterated that the adequacy issue could be avoided by 
dividing the class “into homogeneous subclasses[.]”  Id. 
at 856.  Further, the Court suggested that subclassing 
may be necessary when a class can be divided into 
“easily identifiable categories.”  Id. at 832. 
Since Ortiz, this Court has confronted the 
adequacy requirement on several occasions.  We have 
recognized that the linchpin of the adequacy requirement 
is the alignment of interests and incentives between the 
representative plaintiffs and the rest of the class.  See 
Community Bank I, 418 F.3d at 307 (“[W]e recognize 
that ‘adequate representation of a particular claim is 
determined by the alignment of interests of class 
members . . . .’” (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa 
USA Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 113 (2d Cir. 2005))); Sullivan, 
667 F.3d at 336 n.5 (Scirica, J., concurring) (noting that 
subclasses were not needed because “all indirect class 
members have aligned interests”); In re Schering Plough 
Corp. ERISA Litig., 589 F.3d 585, 602 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(noting that adequacy focuses on “alignment of 
interests”); In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel 
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Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 784 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(requiring that “the class representatives have interests 
that are sufficiently aligned with the absentees to assure 
that the monitoring serves the interests of the class as a 
whole”); see also Richard A. Nagareda, Administering 
Adequacy in Class Representation, 82 Tex. L. Rev. 287, 
290 (2003) (“Dutifully following . . . the text of Rule 
23(a)(4), current law focuses largely on aligning the 
‘interests’ of the persons within the class.  The idea is 
that the ‘representative parties’ will ‘fairly and 
adequately protect’ those interests and, in so doing, 
legitimately bind absent class members to the resulting 
judgment.”).  Certain intra-class conflicts may cause the 
interests of the representative plaintiffs to diverge from 
those of the unnamed class members.  The adequacy 
requirement “is designed to ferret out” such conflicts of 
interest, In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 
280 F.3d 124, 145 (2d Cir. 2001), superseded by statute 
on other grounds, as recognized in Bateman v. Am. 
Multi-Cinema, Inc., 623 F.3d 708, 722 (9th Cir. 2010), 
“and to ensure that the putative named plaintiff has the . . 
.  incentive to represent the claims of the class 
vigorously.”  In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 622 F.3d 275, 
290 (3d Cir. 2010) [hereinafter “Community Bank II”]. 
 Obviously, not all intra-class conflicts will defeat 
the adequacy requirement.  See 1 Joseph M. McLaughlin, 
McLaughlin on Class Actions: Law & Practice § 4:30 
(8th ed. 2011) (“Not all allegations of conflict will make 
a proposed representative inadequate.”); cf. In re Pet 
Food Prods. Liab. Litig., 629 F.3d 333, 344 (3d Cir. 
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2010).  “The hard question concerning intraclass 
conflicts asks which conflicts should matter . . . what 
divisions should render the class representation so 
defective in structure as to rise to the level of a 
constitutional dereliction,” or violation of Rule 23(a)(4).  
Samuel Issacharoff & Richard A. Nagareda, Class 
Settlements Under Attack, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1649, 1678 
(2008).  A “conflict must be ‘fundamental’ to violate 
Rule 23(a)(4).”  In re Literary Works in Elec. Databases 
Copyright Litig., 654 F.3d 242, 249 (2d Cir. 2011); see 
also Ward v. Dixie Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 595 F.3d 164, 180 
(4th Cir. 2010) (“For a conflict of interest to defeat the 
adequacy requirement, that conflict must be 
fundamental.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 959 (9th 
Cir. 2009) (“An absence of material conflicts of interest 
between the named plaintiffs and their counsel with other 
class members is central to adequacy . . . .” (emphasis 
added)); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 350 
F.3d 1181, 1189 (11th Cir. 2003) (“Significantly, the 
existence of minor conflicts alone will not defeat a 
party’s claim to class certification:  the conflict must be a 
‘fundamental’ one going to the specific issues in 
controversy.”); 6 Alba Conte & Herbert B. Newberg, 
Newberg on Class Actions § 3:26 (4th ed. 2002) (stating 
that for a conflict to render representative plaintiffs 
inadequate under Rule 23(a), the conflict “must be 
fundamental”); cf. Community Bank II, 622 F.3d at 303 
(“Here, there is an obvious and fundamental intra-class 
conflict of interest . . . .”).   
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“A fundamental conflict exists where some [class] 
members claim to have been harmed by the same conduct 
that benefitted other members of the class.”  Valley Drug 
Co., 350 F.3d at 1189.  A conflict is fundamental where it 
touches “the specific issues in controversy.”  Conte & 
Newberg, supra, § 3:26; see also Valley Drug Co., 350 
F.3d at 1189; McLaughlin, supra, § 4:30.  A conflict 
concerning the allocation of remedies amongst class 
members with competing interests can be fundamental 
and can thus render a representative plaintiff inadequate.  
See Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 857; Amchem, 521 U.S. at 626-27.  
A conflict that is unduly speculative, however, is 
generally not fundamental.  See Kohen v. Pac. Inv. Mgmt. 
Co. LLC, 571 F.3d 672, 680 (7th Cir. 2009) (finding the 
adequacy requirement satisfied because “[a]t this stage in 
the litigation, the existence of such conflicts is 
hypothetical.”); Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. 
Co., 267 F.3d 147, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); McLaughlin, 
supra, § 4:30.   
We must thus address two questions:  (1) whether 
an intra-class conflict exists; and if so, (2) whether that 
conflict is “fundamental.”  We answer these questions by 
independently considering the two intra-class conflicts 
cited by the West Objectors to determine whether either 
conflict causes a divergence of interests significant 
enough to undercut the representative plaintiffs’ ability to 
adequately represent the class. 
2. 
 First, the West Objectors argue that there is an 
 37 
 
intra-class conflict between those class members who 
have already suffered leakage, and those who have not 
yet suffered leakage.  All of the representative plaintiffs 
fall into the former category.  The West Objectors argue 
that this presents a classic Amchem conflict between 
“past” claimants (those who have already suffered 
damage) and “future” claimants (those who have not yet 
suffered damage).   
More specifically, the West Objectors argue that 
representative plaintiffs had an incentive to prioritize 
recovery for leakage-related damage that they sustained 
over recovery for the failure to inform that was suffered 
by the entire class.  The Supreme Court specifically cited 
a similar divergence of interests in Amchem, agreeing 
with this court’s opinion below that “[a]lready injured 
parties . . . would care little about [benefits that may be 
important to future claimants] and would rationally trade 
them for higher current payouts.”  Amchem, 521 U.S. at 
611.  To properly analyze the intra-class conflict alleged 
here, we must look to the class as certified as well as to 
the terms of the settlement agreement.  Id. at 627.  An 
intra-class conflict will not necessarily prevent 
certification if the settlement agreement contains 
sufficient structural protections to ensure that the 
interests of the class will be adequately represented 
despite the conflict.  Id.   
This case bears some resemblance to Amchem and 
raises some of the same concerns.  As in Amchem, there 
are members of the putative class who are interested in 
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recovering immediate compensation for existing injuries 
they sustained as a result of the defendant’s conduct, and 
other members who are primarily concerned with 
securing an adequate inflation-protected fund to provide 
compensation for future injury caused by the allegedly 
defective drain systems.  However, the West Objectors 
fail to recognize a critical distinction between the 
representative plaintiffs here and the representative 
plaintiffs in Amchem.  The problem with the 
representative plaintiffs in Amchem was that they “would 
care little” for benefits that would have been valuable to 
other members of the class.  This is because once a class 
member manifested symptoms of asbestos-related 
injuries, that class member would be solely concerned 
with obtaining a “generous immediate payment[ ]” for 
the injury, not securing an “ample, inflation-protected 
fund for the future.”  Amchem, 521 U.S. at 626.  This 
resulted in a misalignment of interests—certain members 
of the class had an incentive to pursue protections for 
future claims, while the representative plaintiffs lacked 
any such an incentive. 
Here, on the other hand, the alignment of interests 
is not so starkly problematic.  A class member who has 
already suffered leakage, and is thus a “past” claimant, 
can continue to suffer leakage into the future to the same 
extent as a future claimant, and can continue to make 
future claims.14
                                                 
14  The Settlement Agreement does distinguish between 
leakage that occurs before notice is sent out, and leakage 
  As such, past claimants also have an 
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incentive to protect the ability of class members to make 
claims for future damage.  Moreover, the settlement is 
structured to ensure that even past claimants have an 
incentive to protect the rights of all members of the class 
to make future claims, and thus to align the interests of 
the representative plaintiffs with those of the class.  As 
the District Court recognized, the representative plaintiffs 
have “an interest in obtaining redress for future damage 
or avoiding future damage caused by the allegedly 
defective systems” that aligns with the interests of the 
other members of the class.  App’x A83.  Thus, although 
this case raises some of the same concerns that caused 
the Supreme Court to invalidate the settlement in 
Amchem, the misalignment of interests here is somewhat 
different than the misalignment of interests in Amchem.   
The West Objectors’ argument is not focused on 
the alignment of these interests, but rather on their 
magnitude.  That is, the West Objectors worry that 
because the representative plaintiffs can seek damages 
for their past leakage, which makes up the vast majority 
                                                                                                             
that occurs afterwards.  The former is a “reimbursable 
repair” that is eligible for immediate reimbursement, 
while the latter is restricted to goodwill claims out of the 
residual fund.  The West Objectors have not alleged that 
this distinction gives rise to an intra-class conflict.  
Moreover, to the extent that any such conflict exists, it is 
indistinguishable from the conflict between the 
reimbursement group and the residual group, which we 
discuss in Part III.B.3, infra.  
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of their damages, they will likely value future protections 
less than class members with no leakage-related 
damages.  We reject this argument for two reasons.   
First, it is unduly speculative.  The “terms of the 
settlement [and] the structure of the negotiations” 
incentivized representative plaintiffs to seriously pursue 
protections for future claimants.  See Amchem, 521 U.S. 
at 627.  Nothing in the record suggests that representative 
plaintiffs had reason to ignore this incentive.  We cannot 
conclude that the District Court abused its discretion 
simply based on speculation about whether the structural 
incentives created by the settlement sufficiently 
motivated the representative plaintiffs to represent the 
rest of the class.  See Kohen, 571 F.3d at 680 (declining 
to find an adequacy problem on the basis of a speculative 
conflict); Robinson, 267 F.3d at 171 (same); 
McLaughlin, supra, § 4:30. 
Second, even if the representative plaintiffs did 
value protections for future claimants less than other 
members of the class, we do not believe that, again on 
this record, their differing valuations would create a 
fundamental conflict sufficient to undermine their ability 
to adequately represent the class.  See Gooch v. Life 
Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 672 F.3d 402, 429 (6th Cir. 
2012) (“Although significant conflicts make a plaintiff an 
inadequate class representative, differently weighted 
interests are not detrimental . . . [b]ecause few people are 
ever identically situated . . . .”).  The West Objectors’ 
argument—that representative plaintiffs derive less utility 
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from protections for future claims than those who have 
only future claims—cannot create, at least on these facts, 
a fundamental intra-class conflict sufficient to undermine 
Rule 23(a)(4).    
As the Sixth Circuit observed in Gooch, each class 
member naturally derives different amounts of utility 
from any class-wide settlement.  Id.  An older or even a 
particularly myopic representative plaintiff, for example, 
might value a front-loaded settlement more than other 
members of the class.  A coupon-clipping representative 
plaintiff may derive more utility from a coupon-based 
settlement than other members of the class.  To hold that 
these differing valuations by themselves render the 
representative plaintiff inadequate would all but 
eviscerate the class action device.  Of course, such 
differing valuations may be relevant to the ultimate 
determination whether the settlement is fair and 
reasonable.  See Girsh, 521 F.2d at 157.  We do not 
think, however, that the difference in valuation here is 
sufficient to call into question representative plaintiffs’ 
ability to adequately represent the class.   
3. 
The West Objectors argue that there is an intra-
class conflict between plaintiffs in the reimbursement 
group and plaintiffs in the residual group.  Because all 
representative plaintiffs are in the reimbursement group, 
the West Objectors argue, they cannot adequately 
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represent class members in the residual group.15
                                                 
15 Members of the reimbursement group that made out-
of-pocket payments for non-reimbursable repairs were 
also eligible to submit claims for reimbursement from the 
residual fund.  This does suggest that the representative 
plaintiffs had some incentive to maximize the residual 
that would likely be available to the residual class.  This 
incentive does not, however, resolve the adequacy issue 
raised by the West Objectors.  The representative 
plaintiffs’ incentive to maximize the aggregate size of the 
reimbursement fund is separate from their interests in 
allocating that fund amongst the class.  The fundamental 
intra-class conflict here is allocative in nature, see 
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 626-27, and concerns the 
representative plaintiffs’ incentive to shift the dividing 
line between the residual and reimbursement groups in 
order to maximize their own recovery, at the expense of 
other members of the class who lacked a representative to 
protect their interests.   Even if the reimbursement group 
managed to negotiate a reimbursement fund that was 
expected to satisfy the claims of the residual group, there 
remained a chance, however remote, that the fund would 
not be sufficiently large.  This risk of loss from any 
shortfall lay primarily with the residual group.  As such, 
even if the reimbursement group had an incentive to 
negotiate for a fund large enough to satisfy the required 
residual claims, the potential risk of loss from any 
shortfall would still create a problematic incentive to 
carve out as many class members from the 
  We 
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agree.   
 The structure of the settlement agreement itself, 
which divides a single class into two groups of plaintiffs 
that receive different benefits, supports the inference that 
the representative plaintiffs are inadequate.  The 
reimbursement group has priority access to the $8 million 
fund.  Only after their claims are satisfied can the 
administrator satisfy goodwill claims from the residual 
group.  In order to sort the plaintiffs into these two 
groups, representative plaintiffs sorted the various car 
model runs16 by their claims rates.  On this spectrum of 
claims rates, representative plaintiffs drew a line 
delineating the boundaries between the two groups.  
Those model runs with claims rates above the line were 
placed in the reimbursement group.  Those model runs 
with a claims rate below the line were placed in the 
residual group.17
                                                                                                             
reimbursement group as possible.  This incentive gives 
rise to an adequacy problem. 
  It was this line-drawing exercise that 
  
16 Each car included in the class could be sorted into a car 
model “run” which included other cars using the same 
vehicle platform.  App’x A1188-89. 
 
17 There appears to be some dispute over whether or not 
the assignment of individual plaintiffs was actually 
based, as representative plaintiffs allege, on the relevant 
claims rates.  The West Objectors note several outlier car 
models in the residual group with higher claims rates 
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exacerbated the adequacy problem here. 
 Every plaintiff in the class had an incentive to 
maximize the number of plaintiffs in the residual group, 
while ensuring that they themselves were in the 
reimbursement group.  That is, every plaintiff had an 
incentive to draw the dividing line just beneath their 
model run, placing as many cars as possible into the 
residual group.  Doing so would create the least amount 
of competition for the first round of reimbursement 
claims, and would thus give class members in the 
reimbursement group the best chance at having their 
claims satisfied in full. 
The problem is that the interests of the 
representative plaintiffs and the interests of the residual 
group aligned in opposing directions.  Representative 
plaintiffs had an incentive to draw the line just beneath 
their model runs, and to relegate everyone below the line 
to the residual group.  Class members in the residual 
group had an incentive to lower the line just below their 
model run such that they were included in the 
reimbursement group but everyone below the line 
remained in the residual group.  Put simply, 
representative plaintiffs had an interest in excluding other 
                                                                                                             
than certain models in the reimbursement group.  We 
need not address this issue because we conclude that 
even if representative plaintiffs did assign cars into the 
various groups based on claims rates, they still could not 
adequately represent the class. 
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plaintiffs from the reimbursement group, while plaintiffs 
in the residual group had an interest in being included in 
the reimbursement group.  This is precisely the type of 
allocative conflict of interest that exacerbated the 
misalignment of interests in Amchem, 521 U.S. at 626-
27. 
 Volkswagen defends the adequacy of the named 
representatives by pointing to our decision in In re 
Insurance Brokerage Antitrust Litigation, 579 F.3d 241, 
271-72 (3d Cir. 2009).  In that case, we approved a 
settlement in which different members of a single class 
received different recoveries, but where no subclasses 
were certified.  The settlement agreement there calibrated 
the amount of recovery based on the type of insurance 
policy held by the plaintiff, providing that those class 
members who held excess insurance policies received a 
larger recovery than those who held other types of 
insurance policies.  We held that this allocation “is 
simply a reflection of the extent of the injury that certain 
class members incurred and does not clearly suggest that 
the class members had antagonistic interests.”  Id. at 272.  
We affirmed because we found that subclasses were not 
necessary. 
 That opinion, however, did not address the ability 
of the representative plaintiffs to adequately represent the 
class.  Insurance Brokerage did not cite Rule 23(a)(4) 
and cited neither Amchem nor Ortiz in its discussion of 
whether subclasses were necessary.  It did not discuss the 
interests or incentives of the named plaintiffs in the suit.  
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Rather, it applied typicality and commonality principles, 
discussing the similarity between the claims brought by 
all class members, regardless of the type of insurance 
policy held.  Absent any discussion of misaligned 
incentives or intra-class conflict, Insurance Brokerage 
cannot govern our inquiry in this case.   
Plaintiffs also argue that there is no fundamental 
intra-class conflict here because the subcategories were 
drawn up based on empirical data—i.e., the claims rates 
amongst the various model runs.  As a result, they argue, 
the groups were divided based on empirical data, and the 
incentives of the representative plaintiffs had no effect.  
In support of their argument, they point to Eads’s 
testimony at the fairness hearing suggesting that the 
model runs in the reimbursement group had higher 
claims rates than those in the residual group.  Fairness 
Hearing Tr. 35:13-36:12.   
Any dividing line on the spectrum of claims rates, 
however, would produce the same result—those above 
the line would, in general, have higher claims rates than 
those below the line.  The problem with dividing the 
class without having any representation from one of the 
groups becomes clearly untenable in this case because of 
who drew the line.  Eads plainly stated that the line “was 
decided by the lawyers.”18
                                                 
18 The West Objectors argue that the District Court 
should have excluded Eads’ testimony entirely, pursuant 
to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579 
  Id. at 35:13.  However, the 
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representative plaintiffs and their counsel could not 
adequately represent the entire class in determining 
where the line would lie, because the settlement provided 
“no structural assurance” that the class representatives—
all of whom were in the reimbursement group and had 
already suffered leakage—could adequately represent the 
interests of the class members in the residual group.  
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 627.  Thus, on these facts, there is a 
fundamental intra-class conflict between the 
representative plaintiffs, all of whom are in the 
                                                                                                             
(1993).  Under Daubert, a District Court must review an 
expert’s testimony to determine whether it may proceed 
to the factfinder.  Pineda v. Ford Motor Co., 520 F.3d 
237, 247-48 (3d Cir. 2008).  Daubert is not an all-or-
nothing test, however—a District Court can 
independently consider whether each “particular 
scientific [or technical] methodology is reliable.”  Elcock 
v. Kmart Corp., 233 F.3d 734, 745 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (discretely analyzing 
an expert’s various opinions under the lens of Daubert).  
That is precisely what the Magistrate Judge did, engaging 
in a painstaking analysis of Eads’ report, proceeding line-
by-line through his calculations, and omitting or 
adjusting calculations that were inflated or based on 
unreliable methods or assumptions.  The District Court 
did not abuse its discretion in declining to exclude Eads’ 
testimony in its entirety.  United States v. Mitchell, 365 
F.3d 215, 234 (3d Cir. 2004) (reviewing a District 
Court’s decision to admit expert testimony for an abuse 
of discretion).  
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reimbursement group, and those plaintiffs in the residual 
group.  We will reverse the District Court’s order 
certifying the class because the representative plaintiffs 
fail to satisfy the adequacy requirement in Rule 23(a)(4). 
 We see two ways by which the representative 
plaintiffs may satisfy Rule 23(a)(4) on remand.  First, 
they can simply do away with the distinction between the 
reimbursement group and the residual group, and allow 
all members of the class to submit reimbursements with 
no difference in priority.  Without any need to draw a 
line between themselves and other members of the class, 
representative plaintiffs’ interest in maximizing their own 
returns would align with the interests of the rest of the 
class.  Practically speaking, this does not appear to be a 
problem in this case.  Representative plaintiffs project 
that the $8 million reimbursement fund will be sufficient 
to satisfy the claims of those in the reimbursement group 
and the residual group, if projected claim rates hold 
true.19
                                                 
19 Volkswagen appears to suggest that the fact that the 
residual is likely sufficient to satisfy the claims arising 
out of the residual group implies that the representative 
plaintiffs adequately represented the class.  Such an 
argument was made in Amchem, and was explicitly 
rejected by the Supreme Court.  Amchem, 521 U.S. at 
626 (“The disparity between the currently injured and 
exposure-only categories of plaintiffs, and the diversity 
within each category are not made insignificant by the 
District Court’s finding that petitioners’ assets suffice to 
  As such, there appears to be no need to create a 
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residual group. 
Second, the parties could simply divide the groups 
into subclasses that would be certified separately.  The 
Supreme Court has held that subclassing can resolve 
conflicts of interest that might prevent representative 
plaintiffs from adequately representing the class.  See 
Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 856 (holding that an intra-class conflict 
“require[d] division into homogeneous subclasses . . . 
with separate representation to eliminate conflicting 
interests”); Conte & Newberg, supra, § 3:32 (discussing 
the use of subclasses to address “competing interests in 
distributing the monetary relief” available to the class).  
For example, the class might be divided into a 
reimbursement subclass and a residual subclass, each 
with representative plaintiffs to ensure that their interests 
are being accommodated. 
What is clear at this stage, however, is that the 
class as certified fails to satisfy Rule 23(a)(4).  
Representative plaintiffs simply cannot adequately 
represent the interests of the entire class.  Despite the 
exemplary manner in which the Magistrate Judge 
                                                                                                             
pay claims under the settlement.”).  The adequacy 
requirement provides structural protections during the 
process of bargaining for settlement.  The fact that the 
stars aligned and the class members’ interests were not 
actually damaged does not permit representative 
plaintiffs to bypass structural requirements. 
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conducted the fairness hearing, and her painstaking 
efforts to adduce information not elicited by the parties 
during that hearing, we conclude that she abused her 
discretion in certifying the class.  Accordingly, we will 
reverse the District Court’s certification order. 
C. 
The parties also raise a host of issues concerning 
the District Court’s analysis of representative plaintiffs’ 
fee petition.  First and foremost, Volkswagen argues that 
the District Court erred in its choice-of-law analysis 
regarding the fee petition.  Because our analysis of the 
fee petition would turn on the language of the choice-of-
law provision in the settlement agreement, and because 
the parties will need to negotiate a new settlement 
agreement in light of our holding, we cannot decide these 
issues now.20
                                                 
20 We recognize that, as representative plaintiffs noted at 
oral argument, these issues may arise again and may 
necessitate another appeal.  It is possible, however, that 
they will not arise in the same form as currently 
presented.  The parties may choose to address these 
issues if they draft a new settlement agreement.  As such, 
any decision now would be an impermissible advisory 
opinion.  See Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 248 (3d 
Cir. 2003) (“[A] federal court has neither the power to 
render advisory opinions nor to decide questions that 
cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before 
them.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  We thus 
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III. 
 Rule 23(a)(4) was designed to ensure that the 
representative plaintiffs in a class action suit adequately 
represent the interests of the entire class.  The structure of 
the settlement here provides no such assurances.  We 
conclude that representative plaintiffs cannot adequately 
represent the interests of the members of the class in the 
residual group.  We will reverse the District Court’s 
certification order, and will remand for further 
proceedings. 
                                                                                                             
decline representative plaintiffs’ invitation to decide the 
issues arising out of their fee petition. 
